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ABSTRACT 
Stephanie Page Pleasants: Gas Wars—Determining Dependency on Russian Natural Gas among 
EU Member States 
(Under the direction of Holger Moroff) 
 
 From the construction of pipelines to a lack of an EU energy policy to the development of 
alternative energy sources, EU member states have had a difficult time judging where they stand 
on Russian natural gas, which has raised many issues over energy security and interdependency. 
Therefore, the main question of this thesis is to determine to what extent EU member states are 
dependent on Russia for their natural gas resources. Using the countries of the Weimar Triangle 
(France, Germany, and Poland) as a case study, I look at the varying relationships between these 
three actors and Russia as well as their distinct energy make-up. And by analyzing additional 
energy sources, I conclude that while member states altogether are not heavily dependent on 
Russian natural gas, it is necessary to consider the gas dependency of individual member states 
as well as that of Russia. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Europe and Russia have shared an energy relationship for decades, spanning from the 
Cold War
1
 era to today. The two protagonists are geographically linked by pipelines that run 
across the land, carrying oil and gas to various destinations throughout the European continent. 
However, since the 1990s, the links concerning natural gas have shown signs of cracks. The 
long-standing connection between the two powers demonstrates how closely they have worked 
in their energy dealings, but due to issues such as Ukraine gas crises, debates over gas prices, and 
a lack of cooperation in their energy relationship, tensions between European Union (EU) 
member states and the former Soviet Union have arisen over the past several years. Given 
specific features of the gas market, such as those listed above and Russia’s prime gas company 
Gazprom’s monopoly on the resource, I will focus attention on Russian natural gas in contrast to 
oil, which does not share the same issues. 
Often at the center of this gas conflict are energy dependency and energy security. We 
can see many ways in which states or regions can be dependent on one other, from energy 
technologies to pipelines and transporting sources, but in this study, we are analyzing the 
dependence on natural resources, more specifically on natural gas. For many European states, 
particularly in the East, they see themselves as relying too much on Russia’s natural gas supplies. 
As a result, they, as well as many Western states, have sought ways to diversify their energy 
sources, including the exploitation of unconventional gases and the development of renewable 
                                                          
1
While Russia was already experimenting with pipelines and exporting gas and oil before the Cold War, it was not 
until the 1960s and 70s that it engaged more heavily in East-West gas relations (Högselius, 2013: 3). 
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energy, while still importing gas from Russia. Additionally, though this investigation’s primary 
focus is on energy dependency, we will see how some experts argue that it is energy divisiveness 
among EU member states rather than energy dependency that is the real concern (Noël, 2008: 1). 
All of these energy issues lead us to our main question: to what extent are EU member states 
dependent on Russia for natural gas? Some research suggests that they are heavily dependent on 
Russia, while other research often shows that Europe and Russia are co-dependent considering 
that in the past Russia has been the EU’s largest natural gas supplier, and the EU is Russia’s 
largest consumer. Nevertheless, in this study I hypothesize that EU member states as a whole are 
in fact not as heavily dependent on Russia for natural gas as previously believed, as dependency 
varies from member state to member state. Rather, they demonstrate a level of interdependence 
when it comes to this energy resource. 
As part of my theoretical framework, I will incorporate the constructivist and realist 
perspectives into this investigation. I will demonstrate how both theories can complement each 
other in order to explain European-Russian energy relations through concepts such as state 
interests, identity, and energy security. Furthermore, I will also discuss the notion of 
interdependence as seen in Keohane and Nye’s work. Their arguments on the concepts of 
vulnerability and sensitivity give additional support on the subject of energy security. 
The case study that I will employ is that of the Weimar Triangle, a collective consisting 
of three EU member states—Poland, France, and Germany. I am examining individual European 
countries as my case study instead of the European Union inclusively since each country, or 
member state, is unique in terms of energy use and has its own specific relationship with Russia. 
Moreover, the countries of the Weimar Triangle make an ideal example of the various levels of 
energy mixes, consumption, and production in Europe, especially when it comes to dependence 
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on Russia. For example, Poland, once being a satellite nation of the former Soviet Union, tends 
to be more cautious of Russian power and seeks ways to become less dependent on its natural 
gas supplies. It is also widely dependent on coal but has ambitions to explore its shale gas 
potential. France, on the other hand, does not have as potent a relationship with Russia when it 
comes to energy relations and relies on much of its own nuclear energy power plants. Finally, 
Germany has probably the closest energy relationship with Russia and receives more of its 
natural gas than any other member state. This member state has also begun to do away with its 
nuclear energy by shutting down its power plants and has made efforts to improve renewable 
energy resources. As is evident, the Weimar Triangle is a mélange of energy personalities, and 
these countries each possess a strong voice in the EU. Therefore, part of this study is to 
determine if the Triangle could play a role in Europe’s natural gas relationship with Russia and if 
it could help to establish a unified energy policy in Europe. 
 I will follow up my case study with a chapter on alternative resources to natural gas, 
including both renewable and non-renewable sources of energy. I will especially highlight the 
role of shale gas and its potentially significant impact in Europe in the coming decades. I expect 
that the analysis of other energy sources in Europe and not natural gas alone will aid in 
determining the extent of dependency on Russian gas. Finally, in the final chapters of this work, 
I will offer my findings. I stress that although I will not attempt to decipher if Europe is or is not 
in fact dependent on Russia for its pipelines and natural gas supplies, I do, however, assume that 
I will find that the relationship between the EU and Russia is complicated. 
My methodology throughout this study consists of a range of primary and secondary 
sources. My primary sources include EU institutions such as the Commission and Eurostat as 
well as statistics from individual national governments.  I have also conducted an interview with 
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a High EU Civil Servant from Brussels whose expert knowledge on European energy I include. 
My secondary sources span from press articles and scholarly articles to European think tanks and 
organizations such as Notre Europe, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), and the 
Genshagen Foundation.  
 Debates over natural gas in Europe have certainly caused quite the stir between the EU 
and Russia, but there is not only tension between these two regions. Conflict exists among 
European member states as well, and France, Germany, and Poland are no exceptions. 
Throughout this study, we will see how the presence of natural gas plays more than just a role in 
the interaction between the EU and Russia but within EU as well. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
General Theory & Main Concepts 
Before delving deeper into the theoretical relationship between Europe, Russia, and 
natural gas, it is necessary and useful to offer a brief explanation of the general theories and main 
concepts that we will find. At first, the constructivist and realist perspectives may seem an odd 
theoretical pairing. For example as Copeland states, “For more than a decade realism, by most 
accounts the dominant paradigm in international relations theory, has been under assault by the 
emerging paradigm of constructivism” (2006: 1). In other words, realism was the main theory in 
IR (International Relations) for years until constructivism appeared in the late 80s and early 90s
2
 
and added another dimension to the study. In this portion of the investigation, the purpose is to 
bridge the two theories in order to find the link between interests and identity. After all, these 
theories often have contradictory arguments. 
If we begin with the realist view, we find that a common characteristic of this doctrine is 
that the state is the most important actor. We also find that the security of the state and therefore 
the pursuit of state interests are some of its main concepts. Barry Buzan, a prominent scholar in 
the English School of IR theory
3
, makes a smooth connection between realism and security: 
“Realists construct the state as a necessary unit for the well-being and survival of any human 
group within the anarchic international environment. They thus have the makings of a 
transcendent state purpose in the imperative of the struggle for power and security” (1991: 41). 
                                                          
2The term ‘constructivism’ was coined by International Relations scholar Nicholas Onuf in 1989 (Wendt, 1999: 1). 
 
3
The English School is a theory of International Relations that was conceived in the 1950s and 60s. Buzan is a 
contemporary scholar in this school of thought (Wilson, 2013: 1). 
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Constructivism, on the other hand, focuses on identity, ideas, and social norms, which can be 
influenced by history. The EU is often linked with constructivism while realism (interests of the 
state) is typically used to explain Russian behavior, but as we will see in the next section, the 
sector of energy can bridge the two theories. 
Linking Theory with Energy 
National interests play a leading role in this study of Russian imports of natural gas. In 
this case, energy security represents the utmost important interest among EU members. 
Considering that the realist theory values state interests, and this study concentrates much on 
security, the connection that we can make here is that energy security is a prime national interest, 
and not just for Russia. Each member state equally wants to increase its own security. Buzan 
notes that “human beings are the prime source of each other’s insecurity” (35). Therefore, if we 
apply this logic to states, could that suggest that states are the source of each other’s insecurity 
and could we include Russia in this assessment? Buzan’s work might imply that we could. For 
example, he claims that “When the maximal state rules, it is neither unusual nor paradoxical to 
find individuals dependent on the state for maintenance of their general security environment, 
while at the same time seeing the state as a significant source of threats to their personal 
security” (43). Though this statement refers to “the state”, we could possibly change the roles so 
that member states (the individuals) were dependent on Russia (the state) for certain energy 
supplies such as natural gas and that these states view their Russian source as a threat to their 
energy security. Furthermore, in Alexander Wendt’s work, he highlights the ‘security dilemma’, 
to which “Competitive systems of interaction are prone” and “in which the efforts of actors to 
enhance their security unilaterally threatens the security of the others, perpetuating distrust and 
alienation” (1992: 407). This concept explains that actors can become aggressive with one 
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another when they feel they are being threatened. For example, if EU member states attempted to 
seek alternative or additional sources of natural gas, Russia could and has viewed this move as a 
threat, which in turn causes it to respond with aggressive behavior by thwarting these plans (as I 
will later show in the case of pipelines). 
Both identities of the EU and Russia are important in this study because both the EU and 
Russia are still in search of their identities in the international arena. Russia, on the one hand, is 
still reforming itself in a post-Soviet phase, and the EU, on the other hand, struggles to establish 
a solid identity as it supports multiple national identities (Debardeleben, 2012: 4). In this context, 
we can apply the EU’s still-shaping international identity to its energy identity. As I will later 
discuss, EU member states have yet to speak with one voice regarding various issues, but it is 
especially true of energy. Since the EU still tries to define itself and its interests on one collective 
level (e.g. developing a European energy policy), it could still possibly show signs of weakness 
and insecurity in the way of energy. However, the EU is known for being a normative power, 
and though one could argue that it does not display much power or influence on Russia, except in 
the way of market power through competition and energy dealings with many outside sources 
(Forsberg, 2013: 27), the fact is that the EU could hold more power and influence than it, and 
Russia, thinks. If member states were to stand together as a union, the EU could be more 
effective in terms of energy relations, for Russia views “the construction of a common European 
defense identity” (my translation) as a threat to its own perspective of the state being the highest 
power (Laïdi, 2008: 187). 
From an alternate perspective, energy is one area in which Russia has established a strong 
identity, specifically that of oil and natural gas. The country has become an energy superpower 
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over the past few decades, in large part due to its monopolistic gas company, Gazprom
4
. Here we 
can link identity with interests. Not only is part of Russia’s identity built around the energy 
empire it has created, but it is also part of its national interests to continue exporting large 
amounts of supplies to European countries, thereby maximizing its energy security, and in this 
case, security of consumption.  
However, there is another argument that we can analyze—that of interdependence 
between Russia and EU member states. Locatelli underlines interdependence rather than 
dependence between the EU and Russia because not only do EU member states import an 
enormous amount of Russian gas, but Russia also exports most of its gas to EU member states, 
and its gas supplies are essential to its economy (40). In Keohane and Nye’s work on the subject, 
they introduce the concepts of vulnerability and sensitivity. As framed in their book Power and 
Interdependence, “Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework—
how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the 
costly effects?” (12). The European Union has not developed a central policy among its member 
states concerning energy, and it does not have strong policies toward Russia nor has it been 
successful in renewing those that it already has. Even the 2003 EU Security Strategy touched on 
energy dependency but failed to fully address it and develop policies for it (European Union, 
2003: 2-3).  
Furthermore, Keohane and Nye add that “what matters is not only the proportion of one’s 
needs that is imported but the alternatives to imported energy and the costs of pursuing those 
alternatives” (13). This refers not only to how much natural gas member states import from 
Russia but also the alternatives to Russian gas (vulnerability). For example, with the shift to 
                                                          
4Gazprom is the dominant gas company in Russia, with 78% of the country’s gas production. Furthermore, it is a 
vital instrument of the state, as the Russian government owns 51% of it (Locatelli: 57). 
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shale gas in the U.S., the states may not import as much foreign gas as it used to. Not only have 
LNG exports been re-routed from the U.S. to Europe, but some EU member states themselves 
have begun to develop their own shale gas potential. However, now that U.S. gas sources have 
become more domestic and many EU states are reluctant to explore their shale gas options, gas 
could become more costly to Europe. 
According to Keohane and Nye’s work, “The vulnerability dimension of interdependence 
rests on the availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face” (13). Phrased 
in simpler terms, are EU member states able to diversify their sources? The authors continue that 
“Vulnerability is particularly important for understanding the political structure of 
interdependence relationships. In a sense, it focuses on which actors…can set the rules of the 
game…[and the] key question for determining vulnerability is how effectively altered policies 
could bring into being sufficient quantities of this, or a comparable, raw material, and at what 
cost” (15). Locatelli highlights the vulnerability of states in relation to natural gas, connecting it 
with energy security and diversifying sources. She postulates that “the main underlying idea is 
that diversification constitutes for a country (or an actor) a factor of risk reduction linked to 
imports and therefore to dependence relative to the exterior” (my translation) (38). Therefore, by 
varying gas imports, European states are less dependent on Russian supplies, thereby increasing 
their energy security. But it is not always that simple. The vulnerability of some states depends 
on its variability (40). Some states are more vulnerable than others when it comes to gas 
dependency. Poland, for example, is much more vulnerable than Germany or France, as most of 
its gas comes from Russia, whereas the other two states import gas from several origins. 
Therefore, by relying on different suppliers, Germany and France decrease their dependence and 
therefore their vulnerability. 
10 
 
Our argument presents many concepts to consider, but we find that they can be connected 
when applied to energy dependency between EU member states and Russia. Constructivism tells 
us about norms and identities while realism focuses more on interests, and particularly the 
interests of the state. By using Russia as an example, we can link the two theories since its 
energy interests have become a vital part of its identity. It is also pertinent to use Keohane and 
Nye’s argument as we may discover that interdependency, which may be more relevant than 
dependency, plays a key role in the relationship between Russia and member states. 
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Chapter 3: Case Study 
The Sides of the Weimar Triangle 
 
Background on the Triangle 
 As previously stated in the introduction, the countries of the Weimar Triangle (Germany, 
France, and Poland) form an ideal example of the energy diversity of EU Member States. Not 
only do they possess unique relationships with Russia who provides some of their natural gas 
imports, but they also display a broad range of energy mixes as well as different perspectives on 
the future of EU energy. Furthermore, as Andoura explains, Germany, France, and Poland are 
“often representative of the main lines of division” in the EU as a result of their energy 
differences (10). Yet despite their initial purpose, they are often met with conflict and indecision. 
 The Weimar Triangle was established in 1991 among France, Germany (already two 
powerful voices in the EU), and Poland, who would eventually become an EU member and was 
growing to become a substantial player in Eastern Europe. According to Lang and Schwarzer, 
the purpose of the Weimar Triangle was to “emphasise the shared values between the three 
countries” (2011: 2). Andoura additionally offers three objectives of the Triangle: to promote 
dialogue between the leaders of the three countries about the challenges that the EU faced, to 
develop a mutual understanding of each nations’ individual positions on EU issues, and to 
strengthen the relations between “civil societies” of the Weimar Triangle (2). However, shared 
values and cooperation have not been so easy to accomplish. In fact, cooperation among the 
countries appears more “frozen” (Andoura: 5) than anything else, which is most likely due to 
each country’s individual preferences and concerns as we will see below. 
12 
 
Structure of France’s Primary Energy Consumption 2012 
 
        Source: Graph taken from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies 
Table 1 
France’s Natural Gas Imports by Origin in 2012 
 
Source: Graph taken from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies 
Table 2 
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France 
 France is an interesting case concerning natural gas. According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, the country does not produce much of its own gas compared to 
other EU countries; therefore, it must import in order to satisfy demand. However, French 
authorities have estimated that the demand for natural gas could fall in the coming years. What 
does power the country, however, is its nuclear capacity. While some countries have been 
steadily decreasing their reliance on nuclear energy, France dominates in this category. In fact, 
France is second only to the United States when it comes to nuclear capacity, and in 2012 the 
country generated 407 terawatt hours, which is equivalent to about 83% of its total generation 
(EIA). As Table 1 illustrates, in 2012 44% of primary energy consumed in France came from 
nuclear, hydraulic, wind, and photovoltaic energy, 30% from oil, 4% from coal, and 7% from 
thermal and renewable energy (Insee, 2014). Of these sources, however, only 15% comes from 
gas. Additionally, as we see in Table 2, Russia comprises a large portion of that gas, but it does 
not dominate. Norway is by far the largest supplier of gas in France, followed by Russia and the 
Netherlands (Insee). France boasts a wide variety of natural gas supplies, including those 
countries listed above, and it also imports LNG from countries such as Algeria Nigeria, Egypt, 
and Qatar (EIA). Therefore, compared to other countries, France does not display a heavy 
dependence on Russian natural gas in that it relies much on producing its own sources of energy, 
and what gas that it does import it has diversified among various sources. 
 Although France does not boast the highest level of renewable energy, it is increasing. 
For example, this member state is counted among a handful of countries that produce the most 
wind-powered energy in the world and holds nearly 7.5 GW (gigawatts) (Gsänger and Pitteloud, 
2013: 7). It also tops the charts in solar energy. As part of the 2012 top 10 countries for PV 
14 
 
(photovoltaics) capacity, France produced 4.0% (REN 21, 2013: 41) of the total. Furthermore, 
France is the second-largest producer of biofuels in Europe and even produces biodiesel for the 
transportation sector (EIA). Nevertheless, while France has made strides in renewable energy, 
we will see that it is Germany that has made the most progress in this field. 
Germany 
Energy in Germany is generally well diversified. Among its energy mix, it is still a coal-
producing country, but the EU is making strong attempts to decrease carbon-burning fuels
5
.  
Although Germany still burns and imports coal, it appears that its imports from other EU 
countries have decreased from nearly 6 million tons in 2008 to roughly 3.7 million tons in 2012 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014). When it comes to nuclear energy, however, Germany has done 
more than curtail its reliance on it. It has rapidly decreased its usage by shutting down its nuclear 
power plants in the past several years, especially after the disaster at the Fukushima power plant 
in Japan in 2011.  
Germany has also spent much time, money, and resources into renewable energy. In fact, 
since 1990, Germany has increased its renewable energy source by 141%, making it a leader in 
areas such as wind power, photovoltaic power, solar power, and biofuels” (Andoura: 10). Wind 
power particularly blows breath into renewable energy. As of 2012, Germany was the biggest 
wind market in Europe with a total capacity of 31 GW and has become a successful example for 
others to follow (Gsänger and Pitteloud: 13). It is even in the top five wind markets in the world. 
Furthermore, in the 2012 solar sector, Germany contributed more to solar PV than any other 
country at 32% of the global total (REN 21, 2013: 40-41). To illustrate how much renewable 
resources have altered Germany’s energy sources, Germany’s gross electricity consumption from 
                                                          
5
The EU aims to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels and 80-95% by 
2050 (European Union, 2014). 
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Germany’s Gross Electricity Production, 2013 
 
       Source: Graph taken from the Statistisches Bundesamt 
Table 3 
renewable resources has grown from 3.2% in 1991 to 24.7% in 2013 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2014). And as seen in Table 3, renewable energy took up nearly a quarter of Germany’s total 
electricity production in 2013. Although Germany covers the spectrum of energy resources, 
when it comes to natural gas, it has typically carried on a tight relationship with Russia.  
Along with Italy, Germany imports more natural gas from Russia than any other EU 
member state. Table 3 proves that Germany does not produce a great deal of natural gas itself, at 
11% in 2013; therefore, like France, it must import it to keep up with demand. According to 
Noël, about 40% of the Russian company Gazprom’s entire profits to the EU are sent to 
Germany and Italy (9). However, while Germany does import an exorbitant amount of gas from 
Russia, the figure could be decreasing. Since 2006 and again in 2009, the number of terawatt 
hours used in CIS/Russian Federation natural gas supplies has been steadily decreasing. For 
example, since 2008 when they hit a peak of 419.9, they have declined to 353.4 by 2012  
16 
 
 
Source: Graph based on data taken from Poland’s Central Statistical Office 
Table 4 
(Statistisches Bundesamt). Therefore, perhaps since 2006 and 2009, Ukraine’s gas crises have 
had a strong impact on Germany’s gas imports from a slightly unpredictable Russia, encouraging 
it to curtail its imports or search for alternatives. 
Despite being a player in what was supposed to be a group whose primary purpose was to 
foster cooperation in the EU, Germany has had its fair share of conflict with those countries it 
borders, particularly that of Poland. When Germany made agreements to begin the Nord Stream 
pipeline with Russia, it did not inform Poland of these plans, a decision that came with 
consequences. For instance, after the incident, Poland decided against commencing negotiations 
on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the EU (Andoura, p. 21). 
But Poland, though Germany’s neighbor, is often caught between a rock and a hard place, 
namely desire for more energy security and Russian natural gas. 
Poland 
Poland, like France and Germany, is one of the largest primary energy producers in the 
European Union, comprising 8.5% of that total in 2011 (Central Statistical Office, 2013: 49), but 
40% 
24% 
12% 
12% 
10% 
Poland Energy Consumption 2012 
Hard Coal 
Crude Oil 
Natural Gas 
Lignite 
Other 
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it is still a unique case from its neighbors. While the two Western countries do not rely as much 
on Russia for natural gas, Poland still does, but gas is not its main energy resource. Similar to 
Germany, Poland is also a big coal producer and consumer. In fact, 83% of electricity is 
produced from hard coal (44). In 2012, hard coal was the most important energy carrier produced 
in Poland at 62%, though the country consumed nearly 50% more than it produced in total (42). 
As for natural gas, production of this resource covers less than 30% of annual consumption while 
the rest is imported, and consumption is increasing (44). Also in 2012, as Table 4 illustrates, 
Poland consumed 40% of hard coal and 12% of lignite (another type of coal), 24% of crude oil, 
and 12% of natural gas, while the remaining 10% made up other resources. Like France, natural 
gas does not comprise a huge portion of its energy consumption; however, unlike France, an 
enormous portion of Poland’s gas comes from Russia. 
Also unlike France, the Polish government has not been shy about its plans to explore and 
develop its shale gas resources as we will see in the next chapter. Even though Poland relies 
mostly on its own coal production for energy, the gas that it does consume primarily originates in 
Russia. Yet if the government decides to further develop its shale gas reserves, it could mean 
greater independence from Russian gas. Poland has also begun to develop its LNG capacities. 
According to Polskie LNG, Poland has been constructing an LNG terminal in the city of 
Swinoujscie, which is slated to be completed in late 2014 or 2015. With this project Poland has 
the opportunity to better diversify its sources and improve its energy security by importing LNG 
from North Africa and the Scandinavian Peninsula. Although construction plans have been 
delayed, the terminal is expected to receive 5 bcm (billion cubic meters) of gas a year with the 
possibility of increasing supply to 7.5 bcm a year. One terminal does not tip the scales of Russian 
natural gas dependency; yet if Poland were to continue its LNG importation and shale gas 
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development, then it is possible that the country could see a reduction in Russian gas imports. 
Poland does rely mostly on gas and coal supplies, but it has still grown in renewable resources. 
For instance, though the share of renewables in electricity consumption in 2012 was still small, it 
has experienced “rapid development” in the way of biomass, wind, and biogas (Central 
Statistical Office: 48). In addition, Eastern Europe has proven to host the world’s highest growth 
rates in wind energy, and by 2012 Poland had grown by 54% (Gsänger and Pitteloud: 6). 
Concerning its relationship with its two neighbors, Poland seems to want solidarity
6
. 
Nevertheless, it has a difficult history and relationship with Russia. As a former Soviet republic, 
Poland has become the voice of other previously Russian territories in Eastern Europe. Poland 
also often feels left out of important negotiations with the other two member states which tend to 
overlook the potential political power that the Weimar Triangle could possess (Lang and 
Schwarzer: 4). But the reason for the Triangle’s lack of coherence and cooperation partly lies in 
the murky waters of a poorly developed and defined energy policy. 
A European Energy Policy and Pipeline Politics 
Thousands of miles of pipelines link some member states with others, yet there is not a 
single European energy policy that connects them. If there were, we would not have the same 
pipeline politics as we do today, which we will discuss later. The lack of an energy policy is 
surprising given that years ago it was energy that helped to unite European nations. As Pol-
Henry Dasseleer reminds us, the European Union was originally founded in 1951, at least in 
some part, on energy as the Coal and Steel Community (2010: 3). While energy is still a 
detrimental aspect of the modern-day community, the member states lack a single voice and a 
common European policy that deals with energy and with Russia. According to Laïdi, speaking 
                                                          
6“…when negotiating the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, after the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, Poland insisted 
on the inclusion of a solidarity clause in the new Treaty Article dealing with energy. Article 194 TFEU now states 
that European energy policy should be developed “in a spirit of solidarity” (Andoura: 21). 
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with one voice does not necessarily mean creating one single policy, rather it means cooperating 
and “coordinating national policies” through common principles (198). Therefore, for Laïdi it is 
not imperative that member states have one policy to cover all their interests, but they do need to 
make their national policies coincide. 
But why has it been so difficult for them to accomplish this step? First of all, as with the 
countries of the Weimar Triangle, each member state has its own set of interests, energy mixes, 
and distinct geology, which makes it challenging to create a policy on which everyone can agree. 
Also, member states have developed a sort of “energy patriotism” (Andoura, Delors, and 
Derdevet, 2013: 1), meaning that since historical ties and individual energy preferences are so 
diverse, EU countries tend to put their own energy needs above those of the community. Here is 
where Noël mentions the “divisiveness” of member states, which is the real concern, rather than 
the question of dependency. For him, member states are not at odds over Russian gas because 
they are too dependent on it but rather because they each import different amounts of natural gas, 
have varying access to alternate natural gas sources, and possess unique energy mixes (1). 
Second, member states are accustomed to making bilateral agreements with Russia instead of 
putting the weight of the EU behind these agreements (Andoura and d’Oultremont, 2013: 4). In 
fact, Russia vastly prefers communicating on the state level as opposed to the EU level since it 
still poses a threat. However, with member states, they speak a sort of “state language” that 
Russia understands (Laïdi: 189). Therefore, thanks to energy patriotism and bilateral discussion, 
member states lack a real push for a single energy policy. Member states are aware of the 
advantages of an energy policy, but if there is nothing that binds them to their agreements, then 
there is no incentive.  
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 The lack of an energy policy could produce unfavorable consequences for the EU. 
Without it, the relationships between member states could become more conflicting, which is 
where pipeline politics come into play. Competition and rivalry are two words often mentioned 
regarding natural gas pipelines and relations between member states and Russia, especially when 
it comes to securing their energy futures. For example, even before the gas crises in Ukraine in 
the 2000s, the EU was preparing for the Nabucco project.  Initiated in 2002, this pipeline would 
transfer supplies from the Caspian Sea, bypass Turkey, and deliver natural gas to several EU 
countries, including Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. The goal of this community 
project was to lessen gas reliance on Russia by bringing in 31 bcm every year and to supply the 
growing demand for gas in Europe (Laïdi, Crişan-Revol and Parmentier, 2010: 13-15).  
However, Russia intervened by buying gas from Azerbaijan, which was originally 
planning to support Nabucco. Since Russia secured much of the gas for itself, it put an obvious 
dent in the project
7
. After seeing plans of the EU to build Nabucco, Gazprom along with 
independent European gas companies, notably Italy’s ENI, quickly launched plans for the South 
Stream pipeline in 2007 (17). This Gazprom project has been deemed Nabucco’s rival as it 
travels a similar path. Though it originates in Russia, it also runs below the Black Sea and into 
Europe (south-stream.info). As Locatelli suggests, Nabucco was supposed to open up a new 
corridor of supply. Yet, as a handful of EU member states were attempting to diversify their 
natural gas imports, Russia was concerned with securing its own exports to Europe, and Nabucco 
would have spoiled those plans by making way for additional suppliers (p. 52). Laïdi explains 
that “[Russia] wants to avoid that [the European market] diversifies its sources of supply. Its 
strategic interest is therefore less about cutting the flow of gas to Europe than about preventing it  
                                                          
7
Construction on Nabucco became difficult after losing Iran as a source of supply due to the country’s own political 
crisis. Member states then had to search for other sources to replace it (Laïdi, Crişan-Revol and Parmentier:15-16). 
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Map of South Stream Pipeline Route in the Black Sea 
 
 
    Source: Graph taken from RT network via gazprom.com 
Table 5 
from opening up others elsewhere” (my translation) (2008: 191). As a result of Russia’s South 
Stream plans, the Nabucco project was never realized
8
. 
Similar to the South Stream project, the Nord Stream pipeline equally caused quite the 
stir in Europe. Construction of the first line of the twin pipelines began in 2010 with the second 
line transporting natural gas by October 2012, and together, the lines have the capacity to 
transport over 50 bcm of gas per year (nord-stream.com). Gas companies such as 
Wintershall/BASF, E.ON, Gasunie and GDF SUEZ
9
 collaborated with Gazprom on Nord 
Stream, which spread from Russia, through the Baltic Sea, and into northern Germany. The goal 
                                                          
8
The European Commission and Russia are currently in talks over South Stream to discuss “legal and technical 
issues related to the planned pipeline” which could possibly postpone its operation (Croft, 2014). 
 
9
It is worth noting that many European gas companies have carried out long-term contracts with Russia for decades, 
and as a result of these agreements, these companies view their long-lasting relationships as energy security (Laïdi: 
202). 
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was to bypass transit countries
10
 such as Ukraine and Poland, thereby securing more reliable 
routes (Locatelli: 53). However, these countries were originally unaware of the project, and this 
turn of events strained the relationship between Germany and Poland which, as this study has 
shown, have dissimilar relations with Russia. While this project helped to make Russian gas 
exports more secure, it questioned energy solidarity and trust between member states (Andoura, 
2013: 64) by once again showing how difficult it is for them to cooperate on security and 
diversification issues. 
Controversy over pipelines does not only exist within the EU’s domain. Member states 
are currently at an impasse with Russia due to political events in Ukraine in early 2014. After 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, Moscow reported that it plans to begin 
work on a pipeline project that will deliver gas to the peninsula. Thus far, the logistics of the 
proposal are not certain, but government representatives have stated that this Gazprom-backed 
construction could cost up to $171 million (€123 million) to build, span a cool 400 km (250 
miles), and have a capacity of up to 2 bcm of gas a year (Soldatkin, 2014). It is not yet clear 
which path the pipeline will take, though two routes are possible: either originating in Krasnodar 
in the south of Russia or Anapa, another southern Russian city. As Table 5 illustrates, this infant 
pipeline would most likely be an extension of the already planned South Stream pipeline, 
breaking away in one of the southern Russian cities (RT, 2014). Moscow would additionally 
build three power stations on the Crimean peninsula which would cost almost $3 billion (€2.16 
billion) to build. Crimea primarily receives its gas from Ukraine which in turn imports most of 
its gas from Russia. However, due to political upheavals in the country, gas prices in Ukraine 
have skyrocketed by 40% from $268.50 to $385.50 (€191 to €277.5) per 1,000 cubic meters 
                                                          
10
Energy transit, through Ukraine for example, is often called the Achilles heel of Russia, since before Nord Stream, 
80% of Russian gas exports went through Ukraine first (César, Cornu, Lamure, et al., 2010: 17). 
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(Soldatkin). These dramatic increases could possibly force Ukraine to seek gas elsewhere, which 
would most likely include its Western neighbors, though they would not be able to supply all of 
the country’s demand. However, should member states choose to further aid Ukraine, it could 
place them in an even more delicate situation with Russia. They have cautiously disapproved of 
Russia’s actions, as they still import most of their gas from the energy giant. Furthermore, the 
invasion could have an impact on U.S. gas. The U.S. Congress has been pushing to pass bills that 
allow for less strict regulations on exporting American gas in which Europe would be one of the 
destinations. Therefore, this move could not only potentially come to the aid of Ukraine in the 
long-term, but it could also be a source of diversification for EU member states (Goldenberg, 
2014). 
The New Role of the Weimar Triangle? 
 For decades now EU member states have struggled and failed to produce a European 
energy policy, and they still do not have a clear and current policy toward Russia. One of the 
biggest concerns seems to be that they simply cannot agree and cooperate on these issues. That is 
where the Weimar Triangle could once again serve a purpose. Research shows that up until now, 
the Triangle has done very little in the way of bringing France, Germany, and Poland together to 
be the backbone of the EU. In fact, Lang and Schwarzer explain that apart from “glitzy 
summits”, the three countries have not had much influence at all in the way of European politics 
(1). However, is it possible that we have not yet seen the full potential of the Weimar Triangle 
and that it could still exert influence over the remainder of the EU? Lang and Schwarzer continue 
to demonstrate that the EU needs to form small groups of member states in order to assist in the 
absence of cooperation and that the Weimar Triangle could be one of these groups to help 
influence other member states (1). For them, these countries would become “an alliance of 
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‘heavyweights’” (4). This influence could be of particular use in the debate over energy and even 
more specifically over Russian natural gas. France, Germany, and Poland, diverse as they are, 
could be the glue that holds the EU together in creating a policy toward Russia and weaning 
states off of the country’s gas. Yet Noël suggests that the “solution to the Russian gas challenge 
lies not in foreign energy policy but in reform of the European gas market itself” (3). Therefore, 
if the Weimar Triangle countries made a more substantial effort to use the influence of their 
‘heavyweight’ status, then other member states may possibly put greater effort into making those 
appropriate changes in the gas market. 
 The bottom line is that France, Germany, and Poland could lead other EU member states 
to less overall gas dependency and a stronger gas market. To further develop this, Andoura offers 
conditions that the Weimar Triangle countries should meet if they want to achieve more 
cooperation and cohesiveness. First, he suggests that they should start acting like the ‘Triangle’ 
that they are instead of working solely as bilateral partners. Additionally, he emphasizes that 
these countries should have the freedom to disagree with each other without causing major 
tension. This condition is particularly crucial in that they should be able to disagree in healthy 
ways rather than only dispute, which could lead to misunderstandings and conflict. In this case, 
the Weimar Triangle should act as a “mediation forum” between the three powers in order to 
prevent conflict and settle disputes before they rise into crises (24). 
 In light of the 2014 protests in Ukraine and the overthrowing of President Viktor 
Yanukovych, the question of how much weight the Weimar Triangle holds once again came to 
the forefront. In late February 2014, European foreign ministers Radoslaw Sikorski, Frank-
Walter Steinmeier, and Laurent Fabius of Poland, Germany, and France, respectively, traveled to 
Kiev to broker a deal with Ukraine’s interim leaders. It seems that these three EU members, 
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particularly Poland, played a vital role in trying to establish peace in Ukraine. According to the 
BBC, the country has been striving to achieve closer European ties with Ukraine for years, 
possibly to strengthen its own security. These events are noteworthy because they could be 
crucial to the Weimar Triangle. Although the organization is never specifically mentioned, the 
fact that the three countries were working together demonstrates that they can in fact act like a 
Triangle in the way Andoura suggested. If they can be even somewhat successful in this role, 
then perhaps it is an indication that they can merge in other ways, such as energy. They have 
already proven a desire to make Ukraine more pro-Western and democratic (i.e., leaning less on 
Russia). Therefore, could they use this ambition and cooperation to make themselves, and indeed 
other member states, less dependent on Russian gas? 
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Chapter 4: What Else is in the Mix? 
Alternative Energy Resources 
 
 The bulk of this study focuses on European Union member states’ dependence on 
Russian natural gas, but in order to determine the measure of this dependency, it is necessary to 
include the scope of alternative energy sources. Zachmann stresses that one of the ways in which 
EU member states can replace Russian gas in order to become less dependent on it is by 
exploring these alternative fuels and resources, such as coal and LNG (2014). Not all research 
stresses European dependence on Russia. Some state that European dependence and Russian 
dominance is simply incorrect and that over the past several decades, Europe has significantly 
diversified its gas imports as well as its alternate sources. Noël claims that the EU as a whole is 
not in danger when it comes to gas supply diversity; however, he also adds that there is an 
apparent difference between countries in Western Europe and those in Eastern Europe (1), 
including their energy mixes.  
Renewable Energy 
 Renewable energy sources are among the most newly developed and quickly growing 
sources of energy in Europe and consist of wind, solar, hydro, geothermal, or biomass power. 
What makes renewables so desirable is that not only can they be used again and again, but they 
also represent energy security (International Energy Agency, 2014). In 2011, renewable energy 
met 20.6% of the EU’s electricity consumption and 13.4% of its gross final energy consumption 
(REN 21: 13). In Germany, renewables reached 22.9% of electricity consumption and 12.6% of 
the total final energy demand (21). Among these sources, wind and solar power have grown to be 
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the most dominant forms of renewable energy. Concerning wind power, in 2012 the European 
continent had more wind farms than any other at 38%, though growth rates have somewhat 
decreased (Gsänger and Pitteloud: 10). Similarly, solar power also stands in the spotlight as in 
2012 the EU had invested in more PV than any other electricity-generating technology, which 
accounted for 37% of all new capacity (REN 21: 40). As previously stated, Germany led Europe 
as one of the world’s top five countries11 for renewable power capacity in 2012, but France and 
Poland have also become players in renewable energy. While Germany reached 31 GW of wind 
power in 2012, France achieved 7.4 GW and Poland nearly 2.5 GW (18). And with solar PV, 
Germany and France made it on the list of the top ten countries with solar capacity at 32% and 
4.0%, respectively (41).  
With the sharp increase of renewable energy, especially in countries like Germany, 
European member states are on their way to achieving some of their goals for the 20-20-20 
targets
12
. Also with renewable energy comes less dependence on fossil fuels and energy imports. 
Europe has certainly increased its production of renewable energy over the past few decades. 
Therefore, with the continuation of renewable energy, the EU could become more energy secure 
as it would not need to rely as much on fossil fuels such as coal or gas, nor would it need to 
import as much. 
Coal 
Coal has been one of the longest-running energy sources among the fossil fuels, and in 
some member states, is still being used to a high degree. Among the Weimar Triangle countries, 
Germany and Poland have been large consumers of coal. This resource is one of the most 
                                                          
11
Along with China, the U.S., Brazil, and Canada (REN 21: 13) 
 
12
20-20-20 targets are specific objectives that the EU has determined to meet by 2020. These objectives include 
“20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 levels”, “20% of energy consumed in the EU 
from renewable sources” and “20% improvement in the EU’s energy efficiency” (European Union, “Energy”). 
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polluting fossil fuels and has come under sever scrutiny for its CO2 emissions, but with new 
technologies, even coal has the potential to be better for the environment. Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS), for example, is one of the ways in which the EU could continue burning coal 
while reducing its CO2 emissions. It allows for less carbon to pollute the atmosphere by storing it 
underground. However, CCS is still in its infancy and has yet to gain public acceptance. It is also 
currently a costly form of cleaner energy (Andoura and Hinc, 2013: 267). While many 
Europeans would like to see their reliance on coal, and other carbon-emitting fuels shrink, it has 
been in use for so long and some countries are still reliant on it, especially if they already have an 
abundance of coal resources. However, by making coal “cleaner”, it raises the question if some 
countries would prefer using their own coal rather than importing foreign gas, even though it is 
the cleaner fuel, as it could be the cheaper option. Andoura and Hinc demonstrate that there are 
only two solutions to reducing the burning of coal: either increase gas imports (along with other 
energy imports) or develop cleaner ways to use coal, hence CCS (267). If EU countries decide to 
increase gas imports, then they could be looking at an increase in Russian natural gas 
dependence, but if they invest in CCS and other “greener” technologies, they could possibly 
slightly lower dependence on Russian natural gas. As the two authors suggest, in order to 
continue developing cleaner coal technology, the EU may have to amplify gas supplies in the 
short to medium term, but it would benefit them in the long-term, as they would become more 
independent over time.  
Nuclear Energy 
 Nuclear energy is one of the most highly-debated energy sources in Europe. Though 
much cleaner than coal, power plant accidents tend to cause disastrous and massive 
consequences. Many countries rely on nuclear power plants to produce their electricity, but after 
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the Fukushima power plant incident in Japan in 2011, some EU member states have questioned 
the security of nuclear energy. For example, while some countries such as France continue to use 
nuclear power, Germany is among those that have steadily phased them out. Pushing for more 
nuclear power could possibly decrease Russian dependence, but as many EU member states are 
shutting down their power plants, it is not a likely solution. Furthermore, some researchers do not 
see it as credible in the medium term and claim it would not prevent member states from being 
less divided over the issue (Noël: 2). 
LNG 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) has certainly played and will play a role in future gas supply 
diversification, especially in the way of transportation. Rather than carrying gas via pipelines, 
LNG is transported across the ocean on ships. Aside from renewable energy, LNG is one of the 
cleanest and least harmful sources of energy. As stated on Polskie LNG Company’s website, in 
the case of a leak, LNG cannot pollute the water or ground as it would evaporate and be rarefied 
in the atmosphere (polskielng.pl). Gas, when it is liquefied, can also be shrunk by 600 times, 
allowing for huge amounts to be transported to their final destination at one time (Shell Global). 
Additionally, there is potential for LNG imports coming from North Africa and Scandinavia 
(Andoura and Hinc: 269). According to Andoura and d’Oultremont, 15% of EU gas imports 
already come through LNG from North Africa, Qatar, and Nigeria (3). As a result of these 
factors, Europe could become even less dependent on Russian gas and more diversified in the 
way of gas imports. Furthermore, it is possible that LNG import capacities were underused in 
2013. For example, Zachmannn claims that about 180 bcm of re-gasification capacity still exists 
in the EU, while only 46 bcm was used in 2013. Also, 35 bcm is still under construction, which 
could be a source of additional gas. However, with the global LNG market becoming more 
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integrated, this energy source may not be as useful to Europe as previously thought since it does 
not have a single wholesale gas market (Noël: 6). LNG has certainly changed the gas market by 
making it easier to transport the resource; however, it is unconventional gas that has taken the 
energy world by storm. 
The Shale Gas Revolution 
 The exploitation of shale gas is one of the most significant events to happen not just in 
the realm of gas but in that of energy. Since the shale gas boom in the U.S., other countries and 
regions around the world have been thinking of developing their potential shale gas reserves as 
well, including Europe. Shale gas is detrimental in this investigation because it has had and could 
have a huge impact on Europe’s future gas imports. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has 
called this era the Golden Age of Gas (Andoura and d’Oultremont: 5), and has otherwise been 
described as the Third Industrial Revolution (Dasseleer: 3). Such titles demonstrate how much of 
an impact shale gas has already had in certain parts of the world and what effect it could have on 
the EU’s natural gas imports. 
 The United States have already undergone shale exploration for decades and therefore 
could be the best representative of shale gas employers for a Europe that is still wary of its 
consequences. To begin with, the overwhelming supply of gas in the U.S. has caused LNG 
cargoes destined for North America to be diverted to other destinations, which includes certain 
areas of Europe (Ernst and Young, 2011: 5). Therefore, with the influx of LNG imports in 
Europe, Russian gas imports could be on a temporary decline. Additionally, shale gas is still so 
much in its beginning stages, globally, that only the U.S., Canada, and Australia are currently 
exploring. And, in optimistic terms, these three countries, respectively, could meet 5%, 4%, and 
19% of EU gas demand by 2035 (Andoura and d’Oultremont: 5), thereby aiding in its goal to be 
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less overall dependent on Russian gas. Furthermore, to show the various stages that the two sides 
of the Atlantic are in, Ernst and Young, an American accounting firm, describe the events in the 
U.S. as a shale gas revolution while in Europe, the discovery of shale gas is more an evolutionary 
process (22). 
 As with many energy issues, European countries are divided over shale gas. While some 
are defiantly against the exploration of hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, others promote it. 
Concern is mostly centered on the environmental impact, and as with nearly all forms of energy 
sources, extracting shale gas can have serious consequences. Not only can neglect and 
improperly disposed of wastes lead to water and land contamination
13
, biodiversity degradation, 
and methane emissions, but fracking specifically can also result in possible earthquakes and 
water resource depletion since it requires several million gallons of water. In addition to 
environmental concerns, Europe is simply a more densely populated area compared to the U.S., 
which could increase the risk of health problems (Ernst and Young: 16).  
 Despite the apprehension over extracting shale gas, the fact is that demand for more gas 
will most likely increase in the coming years. Since nuclear energy is being phased out in certain 
locations and renewable energy is still also taking time to develop, some question if Europeans 
will reach a point where they have little choice but to join the shale gas revolution, that is if they 
want to avoid importing more Russian gas. According to Ernst and Young, demand for gas in 
Europe is estimated to increase 20% by 2035 compared to 2008 levels. If these estimates are 
accurate, it will cause many European countries to import more gas, possibly increasing their 
import dependency and once again questioning security of supply (5). Again, Europe is faced  
 
                                                          
13
The fluid that is used for shale gas extraction is comprised 98% of water and sand, and the rest is of fracking 
chemicals (Ernst and Young: 14). However, very little water is recycled after it is used, leaving much of it still 
underground. 
32 
 
Shale Gas Resources in Europe 
 
 Source: Graph taken from the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
Table 6 
with uncertainty, whether it is with alternative energy resources or with the origin of these 
resources, but it is very possible that gas could become the primary energy source in Europe (5). 
It is interesting to see Russia’s stance on the issue. With the rise of shale gas in Europe 
and the decrease of Russian LNG to North America, Russia is naturally concerned that any shale 
gas exploration in Europe would also cause a decline in gas importation. Therefore, Russia has 
appeared doubtful about the “viability of shale gas” (Ernst and Young: 10). Nevertheless, Russia 
could decide to develop its own shale potential. It has taken measures to invest in shale oil with 
the help of French oil company Total (Chazan and Crooks, 2014), and as seen in Table 6, Russia 
holds approximately 287 tcf (trillion cubic feet), or approximately 8 trillion cubic meters, of 
shale gas resources (EIA). But shale development is not Russia’s biggest concern at the present 
time. The country faces its own challenges with exporting its natural gas supplies. First, pipelines 
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transporting the gas often travel great distances to bring it to its final destinations and may even 
pass through transit countries, which can be complicated as seen in the gas crises with Ukraine in 
2006 and 2009. Second, harsh conditions in certain regions make it difficult to work. Third, 
Russia is looking to expand eastward to Asia, so it will need to invest in more infrastructures that 
are required to transport gas to China and its neighbors (Ernst and Young: 10).  
In Europe, however, shale gas is met with mixed feelings. According to Ernst and Young, 
most European countries have adopted a “wait and see” approach (17). In some countries, 
though, their positions on shale gas extraction span the spectrum, which is clearest to see in the 
countries of the Weimar Triangle. For example, France, or at least the current French 
government, on the one hand is decidedly against fracking for the time being, even though it sits 
on one of Europe’s biggest shale reserves, offering strong potential for shale gas development. 
However, in 2011, France passed a moratorium to postpone hydraulic fracturing due to 
environmental concerns, and in 2012 President Hollande put into place a law banning the activity 
(Patel and Viscusi, 2013). Though the French government has been clear on its fracking 
intolerance and it relies much on its own nuclear energy, the question remains if it still wants 
more gas independence. Even French media has suggested that since the country imports such a 
high rate of gas and petroleum, shale gas extraction could bring hope of more energy 
independence (France24, 2013). Another question that could arise is if France jumps on the 
nuclear phase-out bandwagon, what resources would it need to replace it? If hydraulic fracking is 
still banned, then France would have to look to renewable energy, LNG, or importing more 
natural gas. But according to an energy expert from Brussels, what the energy question in France 
boils down to is which type of energy is cheaper and more competitive (EU High Civil Servant, 
2014).  
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Poland’s Shale Gas Reserves 
 
Source: Shale Gas Europe 
Table 7 
On the other hand, Poland, which also has extensive shale gas reserves, has been the most 
forward when it comes to shale gas development. Table 7 shows how extensive shale gas 
reserves are estimated to be in the country, ranging from the southeast to the northern coastline.   
According to an article in the Economist, Poland sees shale gas extraction as a solution to two 
particular problems: it would reduce not only its dependence on Russian natural gas but also 
greenhouse gas emissions as a result of coal-fired power plants (A.E., 2013). However, does 
shale gas truly live up to the hype? First of all, it is unclear just how much shale is locked away 
under Poland’s surface as some studies estimate that it holds between 346-768 bcm while others 
suggest that there is at least 376 bcm in just a few different areas of the countries (Shale Gas 
Europe). For further proof of this, Table 6 suggests that Poland holds about 148 tcf (4.19 tcm) of 
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shale gas reserves. Furthermore, Poland faces several other challenges. Not only is the country’s 
land denser compared to successful states in the U.S. such as Pennsylvania, but some Polish 
citizens do not trust that the administration will enforce regulations to cause the least damaging 
environmental impact (EU High Civil Servant). Nevertheless, it is not too difficult to understand 
Poland’s original stance. Poland, being a part of Eastern Europe, is more dependent on Russia for 
its natural gas supplies, so if it successfully explored shale gas in its own country, then it could 
become more self-sufficient (Ernst and Young: 17).  
Unlike France and Poland, Germany seems neither to oppose hydraulic fracturing for 
shale gas nor to appear overly enthusiastic about it. Germany is still a huge promoter of 
renewable energy, but after the Fukushima accident in 2011, it has significantly reduced its 
nuclear use. Therefore, could it look to shale gas as a viable option (Shale Gas Europe)? 
According to the EIA, it is estimated to have as much as 482 bcm of reserves, so while it does 
not boast as much as Poland or France, it can still hold its own in the way of shale gas. And 
according to studies published in Shale Gas Europe, Germany has allowed for exploratory 
drillings and would continue these drillings not for economic benefits but for more energy 
security. Until drilling results prove sufficient, however, Germany will most likely continue 
importing natural gas from Russia and Norway (Ernst and Young: 17). 
 The situation with shale gas in EU member states is another example of the measure of 
how it is difficult for them to make a collective decision on important energy issues. Many 
countries are highly opposed to such explorations, while others wish to probe further. As Ernst 
and Young put it, “gaining unanimity among member states of the EU on shale gas regulation is 
likely to be an almost insurmountable feat. …To get agreement on common standards, they may 
have to be watered down to such an extent that makes them less stringent that those already in 
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place in some individual member states” (18). But could certain events change the policies of 
member states? In the wake of the Russian take-over in Crimea, many member states have 
received a wake-up call to be less dependent on Russian gas. The UK and Poland are two states 
that have long desired shale gas extraction. Could others that were originally more “hostile” to 
hydraulic fracturing become more lenient in order to lean less on Russian imports (Petroff, 
2014)? Ernst and Young, however, warn of relying too heavily on shale gas reserves should 
Europe choose to advance that option. Shale gas could make European countries more self-
sufficient, but a “shale gas boom in Europe could, in practice, weaken energy security in Europe 
through over-reliance on a single energy source” (23). Therefore, is it worth exploring shale gas? 
Perhaps that depends, and not necessarily entirely, on how desperately member states want to 
digress from importing gas from Russia. 
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Chapter 5: Findings 
The Future of Russian Natural Gas in Europe 
 
 This study did not set out to prove that member states are or are not dependent on Russia 
for natural gas. Instead, the goal was to determine to what extent they are dependent on this 
resource by using Germany, France, and Poland as case studies. Based on research, gas is and 
will be a primary resource within Europe for decades to come. In fact, foreign natural gas use 
could increase in the short- to medium-term if the EU continues to develop alternative energy 
sources such as renewable energy, shale gas, or CCS. While we could hypothesize that member 
states could become more dependent on natural gas in the next few years, this assumption does 
not signify that they will become more dependent on Russian natural gas or that they will 
continue to rely on natural gas in general for decades to come. If member states can collectively 
decide to pursue shale gas development as the U.S. did, then they may decrease natural gas in the 
long-run. However, they will not dramatically decrease imports, as certain member states 
(notably Germany and Italy) have invested far too much time, money, and energy on 
infrastructure, pipelines, and long-term agreements.  
 According to Noël, Europe as a whole should not worry about an over-dependence of 
Russian gas based on two figures. First, as he illustrates in his 2008 study, 6.5% of the EU’s total 
primary energy supply originates from Russian gas, while Russia’s market share of EU gas 
imports is just over 40%, nearly half as much as it was in 1980 (p.1). What is more, other  
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Table 8 
countries and regions have entered the bid to export gas to Europe. For instance, since 1990, 
80% of the growth in European gas imports has come from Norway, Algeria, Nigeria, and 
countries in the Middle East. Furthermore, after nearly two decades, Russia’s share of EU gas 
imports has significantly decreased from 75% in 1990 to just over 40% in 2008 (Noël: 5). As 
Table 8 shows, though Russia was still the dominant supplier of natural gas to the EU, it fell by a 
small percent from 2011 to 2012 while Norway’s share grew by almost 3%, making it nearly 
neck and neck with Russia. Although other sources were further behind the gas giants Russia and 
Norway, together they comprise more than either country. It is vital to remember, however, that 
these figures and Noël are referring to the EU altogether. A vast number of EU countries  
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(particularly those in the West) import very little to no gas from Russia, while Germany and 
those closer to Eastern Europe import a significant amount, a fact we must take into account. 
 We must also reflect on the fact that while EU member states may not be as dependent on 
importing gas from Russia as they were twenty years ago, Russia is still reliant on exporting to 
the EU. As laid out in Table 9, 24% of Russia’s natural gas exports in 2012 were destined for 
Germany alone. Eastern Europe altogether was also 24%, followed by Italy (11%), France and 
the UK (6% each) and other Western European countries at 10% (Energy Information 
Administration). Only Turkey was outside the EU with 19%. As is evident, perhaps one of the 
conclusions we can reach is that not only do member states still import a large percentage of 
natural gas from Russia, but Russia might be more dependent on them for security of 
consumption. Some may still argue that the two are co-dependent, or interdependent. For 
example, Romanova suggests that since the EU imports an impressive amount of its resources 
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from Russia and Russia exports so much to the EU they are dependent on each other “rather than 
one being asymmetrically vulnerable before the other” (2013). For example, the EU imports 36% 
of natural gas, 31% of oil, and 30% of coal from Russia. Conversely, Russia exports 70% of 
natural gas, 80% of oil, and 50% of coal to the EU. But we must question if this co-dependency 
is balanced. Though 36% of gas is an impressive sum, Russia’s exporting 70% is still greater. 
We could also question what kind of power situation this puts Russia and member states in. We 
can argue that Russia exerts power over some EU member states due to the amount of Russian 
gas they import and consume. Nevertheless, since Russia is equally or more dependent on 
member states’ importing of its gas, we could say that they also have power over Russia. 
However, Russia has plans to diversify its own sources, with an eye on its eastern and southern 
neighbors (Romanova). If Russia can secure Asian business, then it will not be as reliant on its 
European clients. Therefore, for the time being, Russia seems more dependent on European 
business than some member states are on Russia; yet that could change with Russia’s opening up 
its markets to Asia. 
 To further analyze this interdependence, we must consider what the consequences are for 
becoming less dependent on Russian gas. In an article from the European think tank Bruegel, 
Georg Zachmannn attempts to persuade that Europe could abandon Russian natural gas within a 
year by importing gas from other sources such as Norway or Qatar, producing more gas 
domestically through the Netherlands, and switching to alternate energy fuels such as oil and 
LNG. While this attempt would be a vastly ambitious feat, the side effects of such a decision 
would be enormous. First of all, while Zachmannn argues that the economic impact would not be 
too severe on the EU, it would be a major blow to Russia’s economy since it is so reliant on its 
energy sector. Second, Europe would have to be prepared for its neighbor’s reaction to such a 
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decision. Russia could very well see this move as a threat and could therefore respond in an 
aggressive manner, as Wendt’s security dilemma would suggest. So although the EU may not be 
as vulnerable as it seems, it would place itself in a sensitive situation because the costs of 
becoming completely independent of Russian gas would be too great. In any case, it is not 
necessarily a bad decision for member states to import natural gas from Russia in moderation, as 
it is still a way of diversifying its sources. However, considering Russia’s militant presence in 
Ukraine starting in February 2014 and its severe increasing of gas prices in the country, EU 
member states may decide that it is the time to lessen its gas intake from Russia or that shale gas 
development appears more feasible.  
 It is not sufficient to factor in solely Russian natural gas imports in this study. In order to 
determine the extent of European dependence on Russia’s resource, it was necessary to include 
alternate energy sources, from renewables to shale gas. It is also essential to remember that the 
European Union is home to nearly thirty member states, none of which share the exact same 
energy make-up. Countries in Eastern Europe, such as Poland, will face more challenges in 
becoming less reliant on Russian gas based on development and historical ties, while those in 
Western Europe, such as France, are already more independent in comparison. Perhaps another 
conclusion we can make is that we cannot say that the EU, or even wider Europe, is or is not 
dependent on Russian natural gas because each nation is so unique from the other. What we 
could assume, nevertheless, is that certain states do not rely on Russian gas imports at all, while 
others continue to import at a relatively high rate to keep up with demand. Therefore, the level of 
dependency is variable according to each member state (Locatelli: 39-40). 
If we take into consideration natural gas decline from Russia and the more diverse 
options that Europe has through LNG, renewable energy development, cleaner technology and 
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domestic unconventional gas potential, then we could assume that member states are not heavily 
dependent on Russia for its natural gas. It is important to recognize, however, that in order to 
achieve more independence and energy security in the long-term, EU member states may have to 
import gas in the short- to medium-term while they develop and explore alternative options. 
However, if member states decide not to embark on shale gas extraction, and cleaner technology 
becomes too expensive to realize, then the EU could be looking at an increase in gas imports, 
and possibly from Russia. But perhaps the only way to avoid the latter and encourage the former 
would be for the EU, especially under the guidance of prominent member states such as France, 
Germany, and Poland, to collectively establish a firm common energy policy to last not only a 
few years but several decades. In this way, EU member states would finally be able to decide as 
a union their best interests and where to take their energy future. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 European member states and Russia have a long, complicated history in which energy 
plays a vital role. Although the two regions have had long-term contracts and far-reaching 
pipelines and have worked together in energy for decades, tensions between governments over 
political crises and gas shortages have created a rift in these relations, causing some member 
states to question the reliability, and indeed, the security of importing large quantities of Russian 
natural gas. Therefore, it became the focal point of this thesis to determine to what extent these 
European countries were currently dependent on Russia for natural gas. 
 To help explain the relationship between Europe and Russia, I analyzed both the 
constructivist and realist theories. As illustrated in the study, the constructivist approach helps to 
explain the role of identity, while the realist perspective focuses on the individual and state 
interests. Furthermore, I applied Keohane and Nye’s assertion on interdependence, vulnerability 
and sensitivity in order to support my arguments on energy security. Together, these theories and 
concepts complemented each other in explicating how state interests and identity are important 
in understanding the energy dynamic between EU member states and Russia. 
 Next, I used the Weimar Triangle as my case study because it allowed for an ideal 
example of a group of EU member states with vastly diverse energy mixes and interests. With 
this group, I demonstrated that EU countries have unique relationships and a vital role in energy 
relations with Russia and therefore cannot all form similar gas relationships. In this section, I not 
only explained the energy production and consumption of these three countries, but I also 
questioned the EU’s ability to create a common energy policy that would allow it to establish 
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common goals and rules in the energy market. In addition, I addressed the current role of the 
Weimar Triangle and its place in the international community.  
 I then mapped out the various energy sources and resources that member states employ, 
aside from natural gas, which include renewable energy, coal, nuclear power, and other gas 
options such as LNG and especially shale. By examining alternatives to natural gas, I was able to 
demonstrate how there are many other options to natural gas, even though some may take years 
to develop and others are still controversial and being weighed by individual member states.  
Finally, I showed how the EU is not heavily dependent on Russia for natural gas, though 
some member states are more reliant than others. Poland, for example, is far more concerned 
about natural gas dependency on Russia compared to France and Germany. Although Germany 
also imports much gas from Russia, this country has made strides in diversifying its own 
resources. Natural gas has become at times an easy and reliable source to manipulate and 
transport, but the debates surrounding it have caused cracks in the figurative infrastructure, and it 
may not prove to be so easy to repair. If anything is certain, it is that European-Russian gas 
relations are still complicated and have an uncertain future, but Europe’s energy future is not set 
in stone. Member states, especially Germany, France, and Poland, have the opportunity to unite 
over Russian natural gas issues and, in optimistic terms, will be conscious of the path they should 
take as a collective force in order to secure their energy diversity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
REFERENCES 
A.E. (2013) ‘Mad and messy regulation’, The Economist, 10 July. 
Andoura, S. (2010) ‘Energy cooperation under the aegis of the Weimar Triangle: Springboard 
for a common European energy policy’, Genshagener Paper 3, pp. 1-28. 
Andoura, S. (2013) ‘Energy solidarity in Europe: From independence to interdependence’, Notre 
Europe Jacques Delors Institute, pp. 1-110. 
Andoura, S. and d’Oultremont, C. (2013) ‘The role of gas in the external dimension of the EU 
energy transition’, Notre Europe Jacques Delors Institute Egmont Policy Paper, 79, pp. 
1-7. 
Andoura, S. and Hinc, A. (2013) ‘An external energy strategy for the EU’, Think global act 
European, pp. 264-270. 
Buzan, B. (1991) People, states and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the 
post-Cold War era. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Central Statistical Office. (2013) Energy statistics 2011, 2012, pp. 1-290. Warsaw. 
César, G., Cornu, G. and Lamure, E., et al. (2009) Rapport d’information. Sénat 182, pp. 1-52. 
Chazan, G. and E. Crooks. (2014) ‘Europe’s dangerous addiction to Russian gas needs radical 
cure’, Financial Times, 3 April. 
Copeland, D. (2006) ‘The constructivist challenge to structural realism: A review essay’, In: 
Guzzini S. et al. eds. Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and 
his critics. London: Routledge, pp. 1-20. 
Croft, A. (2014) ‘Gazprom to hold new talks with EU on antitrust probe’, Reuters, 22 January. 
Dasseleer, P. (2010) Russie-Union européenne: Des regards sécuritaires différents. Paris: 
L’Harmattan. 
Debardeleben, Joan. (2012) ‘Applying constructivism to understanding EU-Russian relations’, 
International Politics, vol. 49, no. 4, July, pp. 418-433. 
Delors, J., Andoura, S. and Derdevet, M. (2013) ‘France paving the way for a European energy 
community’, Notre Europe Jacque Delors Institute, pp. 1-2. 
Easton, A. (2014) ‘Poland’s crucial role as Yanukovych’s rule crumbled’, BBC, 25 February. 
Ernst and Young. (2011) ‘Shale gas in Europe: Revolution or evolution?’ pp. 1-22. 
European High Civil Servant. (2014) Personal Interview. Paris, France. 8 March. 
European Union. (2014) ‘Energy—20-20-20 targets’.  
46 
 
Eurostat. (2013) ‘37-27 imports of natural gas—percentage of extra-EU imports by country of 
origin, 2012’. 
Forsberg, T. (2013) ‘The power of the European Union: What explains the EU’s (lack of) 
influence on Russia?’ Politique européenne, vol. 39, January, pp. 22-42. 
 
France24. (2013) ‘Gaz de schiste : les Sages valident l'interdiction de la fracturation 
hydraulique’, 11 October. 
 
Goldenberg, S. (2014) ‘US expands gas exports in bid to punish Putin for Crimea’, The 
Guardian, 1 April. 
 
Gsänger, S. and J. Pitteloud. (2013) ‘2012 Annual Report’, The World Wind Energy Association. 
Högselius, P. (2013) Red Gas: Russia and the origins of European energy dependence. New 
York : Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques. (2014) ‘Importations de gaz naturel 
par origine’. 
Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques. (2014) ‘Production, consommation 
et importations de gaz naturel en 2012’. 
International Energy Agency. (2014) ‘Renewables’. 
Keohane, R. and Nye, J. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
Laïdi, Z. (2008) ‘Norme et géopolitique’, La norme sans la force: l’énigme de la puissance 
européenne, 2
nd
 edition, Paris : Sciences Po. 
Laïdi, Z., A. Crişan-Revol and F. Parmentier. (2010) ‘Quelles perspectives pour Nabucco et 
South Stream ?’ Centre d’études européennes, pp. 1-86. 
Lang, K. and Schwarzer, D. (2011) ‘Consolidating the Weimar Triangle: European policy 
functions of German-Polish-French co-operation’, German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs, vol. 30, October, pp. 1-8. 
Locatelli, C. (2013) ‘Les enjeux de sécurité dans la relation gazière UE-Russie’, Revue 
d’Économie Industrielle, vol. 143, pp. 35-69. 
Noël, P. (2008) ‘Beyond dependence: How to deal with Russian gas’, European Council on 
Foreign Relations Policy Brief, vol. 9, November, pp. 1-18. 
Nord-Stream.com. (2013) ‘The Pipeline’.  
Patel, T. and Viscusi, G. (2013) ‘France’s fracking ban ‘absolute’ after court upholds law’, 
Bloomberg Sustainability, 11 October. 
Petroff, A. (2014) ‘Russia fallout pushes Europe to develop shale gas’, MoneyCNN, 31 March. 
47 
 
Polskielng.pl. (2012) ‘LNG Terminal in Poland’. 
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21
st
 Century. (2012) ‘Renewables 2013 Global Status 
Report’. 
Romanova, T. (2013) ‘Russia-EU energy ties: Problems and possibilities’, Russian International 
Affairs Council. 
RT. (2014) ‘Heated issue: Russia to construct gas pipeline to Crimea’, 1 April. 
Shale Gas Europe. (2013) ‘France’. 
Shale Gas Europe. (2013) ‘Germany’. 
Shale Gas Europe. (2013) ‘Poland’. 
Shell Global. (2014) ‘What is LNG?’ 
Soldatkin, V. (2014) ‘Russia plans to build undersea gas pipeline to Crimea: newspaper’, 
Reuters, 1 April. 
South-stream.info. (2014) ‘Gas pipeline route’. 
Statistisches Bundesamt. (2014) ‘Gross electricity production, 2013’. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2013) ‘France’. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2013) ‘Germany’. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2013) ‘Poland’. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2014) ‘Russia’. 
Wendt, A. (1992) ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics’, 
International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, Spring, pp. 391-425. 
Wilson, P. (2013) ‘Alternatives to realism: The English school of international relations’, John 
Hopkins University, 28 February, Bologna, Italy. 
Zachmannn, G. (2014) ‘Can Europe survive without Russian gas?’, Bruegel, 21 March. 
 
